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ABSTRACT 
This paper tests competing ideas accounting for the foreign exchange (FX) losses in Barbados in 
recent years. The conventional monetary and absorption approaches have motivated the 
explanation and policy proposals to date. However, this paper illustrates that the conventional 
theories fail to account for the external forces determining FX pressure. We propose a theory of 
monetary dependency by integrating the basic insight of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis into an 
institutionally-consistent monetary framework. The model implies that the narrow policy space 
in the short run is overwhelmed by the falling FX supply in the long term – hence the long-term 
FX constraint. This constraint, moreover, prevents complete adjustment as predicted by the 
reflux mechanism. Although Barbados is the case study – given its recent program with the IMF 
– the model of monetary dependence is applicable, in general, to small very open developing 
countries. The econometric results indicate tenuous support for the monetarist theory, but 
stronger evidence in favor of the monetary dependency theory. Consistent with the prediction of 
latter theory, the trade-weighted American dollar exchange rate and its conditional volatility are 
the strongest determinants.  
KEY WORDS: foreign exchange market pressure, reflux mechanism, center-periphery, bank 
liquidity 
JEL CODES: F30, F31, F40, O11 
*This paper was prepared for the 50th Annual Monetary Studies Conference, Barbados, 
November 6 – 8, 2018. The paper benefitted from helpful comments by participants and Collin 
Constantine. The views expressed in this paper in no way represent those of the Central Bank of 
Barbados. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Barbados has maintained a fixed exchange rate since 1975. This requires that the Central Bank of 
Barbados hold sufficient foreign exchange reserves to maintain credibility of the peg against the 
United States dollar. In recent years, however, the Central Bank of Barbados has seen a decline 
in its level of foreign reserves (IMF 2018). The IMF – in its recent Article IV negotiations with 
that country – notes that international reserves continue to fall in spite of improvement in the 
current account balance. The IMF urges Central Bank of Barbados (CBB) to phase out direct 
financing of central government in an effort to refocus monetary policy towards supporting the 
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fixed exchange rate. The Fund also urges the relaxation of liquid asset requirements that 
commercial banks must hold.   
 In general, the IMF and several observers attribute the cause of the decline of foreign 
reserves to the expansion of the monetary base; in particular, the direct financing of central 
government by the CBB is often cited as the pivotal reason for the loss of foreign exchange. The 
expansion of the monetary base is seen as evidence of money printing. We argue that this 
interpretation comes from the orthodox theories of the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments and the absorption approach. Policy recommendations to date have been motivated 
mainly by these two standard theories. Present policies involve cutting government spending and 
the size of the civil service, as well as recommendations to have commercial banks demand less 
liquid assets in the form of domestic government securities. The rating agencies – namely 
Standard and Poor and Moody’s – downgraded Barbados’ several times since 2000 and more 
recently in 2017 and 2018. The agencies cited the declining foreign exchange reserves, the 
expansion of base money and the excessive domestic debt.  
 We are skeptical, however, regarding the conventional explanation of the decrease in 
CBB’s international reserves. The expansion of domestic currency debt reflects the structural 
constraints a small economy such as Barbados faces in the global monetary system. Central 
banks in economies with a peripheral currency cannot earn excessive seignorage via the issue of 
money at home. This is because the demand for the peripheral currency is limited to the domestic 
demand. Nevertheless, central banks in the periphery can maintain some wiggle room, albeit 
limited, by balancing the demand for foreign currency assets and one-sided sales of domestic 
currency debt to oligopolistic banks and other institutional buyers. The first attempt to measure 
this wiggle room in the case of Barbados was done by Worrell (1995). Moreover, the domestic 
financial institutions often purchase the domestic government security because they cannot 
obtain all the foreign currency in any given time period to meet demand for foreign assets. In 
other words, the inability to get foreign exchange in the short term acts as a friction restricting 
the demand for foreign assets; hence, the banks hold on to the non-remunerated excess reserves 
and buy the local security, thus accounting for the demand for interest-earning excess liquid 
assets (typically domestic treasury bills). This is why all the excess non-remunerated reserves are 
not eliminated via the automatic Nurkse-ian reflux mechanism as outlined by Lavoie (2001). In 
the case of neighboring Guyana, for example, the banks have a tendency to purchase excess 
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liquid assets – primarily domestic treasury bills – when there is a shortage of foreign currency 
and make investments in foreign assets when there is a surplus of foreign exchange in the local 
market (Khemraj 2009). Therefore, the demand for government securities reflects the persistence 
of the foreign exchange constraint or friction. The central bank is constantly balancing the 
demand for foreign exchange and the private sector’s demand for treasury bills given the 
friction
1
.  
 The domestic debt securities are crucial for preventing complete dollarization. In this 
sense, therefore, the sovereign domestic debt is the outcome of a dependent monetary system, 
and not always the product of a reckless government. Monetary dependency means that there is 
incomplete freedom in policy choice given that the demand for the country’s currency is 
restricted at its borders. Dependent monetary economies do not possess a globally acceptable 
currency, their terms of trade tend to deteriorate over time, and fiscal and monetary policies are 
severely restricted by the need to maintain a stable exchange rate. The paper defines dependency 
in terms of its restriction on development possibilities, and not as an explanation of historical or 
continuing underdevelopment (Dixon-Fyle 1978). Moreover, dependent monetary economies 
would tend to have peripheral currencies and their banks and citizens would have a high 
propensity to invest in foreign assets (Thomas 1965). The economies possessing peripheral 
currencies will tend to face gradual dollar encroachment and perhaps complete dollarization; and 
inflation targeting is impossible (McKinnon 2000). The debt cycles of countries in the periphery 
can be determined by the terms of trade (Coelho and Perez-Caldentey 2018).  
 The contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, it presents a simple model showing 
that the accumulation of domestic debt is the result of leaning against a deteriorating terms of 
trade. Therefore, the paper presents a monetary model with a flavor of Prebisch-Singer; hence, a 
model of curtailed policy space under monetary dependency. It is a center-periphery model, but 
speaks more of a central bank policy model that allows for short-run policy wiggle room in a 
fixed exchange rate economy. Secondly, we look at foreign exchange market pressure (EMP) 
under a fixed exchange rate economy. The topic of EMP has been actively studied over the 
years. For example, see the work done by Gevorkyan (2017) and Aizenman and Hutchison 
                                                          
1
 One might ask why the banks continue to support the fixed exchange rate given the foreign currency shortage in 
the presence of non-remunerated excess reserves. The answer has to do with the large portfolio of outstanding 
domestic-currency loans. Rapid devaluation would result in steep inflation pass-through, thus depleting the real 
value of loans.  
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(2012). We tweaked their measure of EMP by considering the foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank relative to the net foreign assets (NFAs) held by commercial banks.  
Thirdly, we test using various time-series econometric specifications the monetary 
approach, the dependency approach and a hybrid model. Although the econometric results find 
evidence in support of both monetary approach and dependency approaches, the evidence is 
much more consistent with the latter than the former. The American dollar trade-weighted 
exchange rate (not the Barbadian trade-weighted exchange rate) is the strongest determinant of 
the EMP. This implies that Barbados’ de facto exchange rate is the trade-weighted rate of the 
United States; hence, the dependency status. The conditional volatility of the trade-weighted rate 
produces a strong precautionary response as well.  
Finally, to complete the study of EMP, we estimate an empirical model of net foreign 
assets (NFAs) of commercial banks. The main determinants are the trade-weighted dollar rate 
and the cash or liquid reserves of commercial banks. The conditional oil price volatility, instead 
of the abovementioned volatility, is the main precautionary variable for commercial banks. We 
also found cointegrating relationships, better than or equaling the five percent level, for the 
monetary dependence model, hybrid model and NFA of commercial banks. The long run or 
cointegrating relationship for the monetary approach is significant only at the ten percent level.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 critically outlines the conventional 
approaches to the balance of payments and our new model of EMP. Section 3 looks at charts of 
recent developments in crucial monetary and macroeconomic variables. Section 4 presents 
econometric tests of the competing theories and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. THREE THEORIES OF EMP 
This section outlines three theories of the balance of payments or EMP. The two conventional 
approaches are first outlined and then our theory of monetary dependency. The absorption and 
monetary approaches to exchange rate determination are well known; therefore, we will not 
spend substantial time here explaining them. We sketch the core ideas as illustrated by Jha 
(1994). The essential idea of the absorption approach is a loss of international reserves can be 
explained as follows. 
( )F X M Y C I G              (1) 
Domestic absorption is A C I G    
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 The change in central bank’s international reserves ( F ) is positive once 0X M  and 
negative when 0X M  . The source of the current account deficit comes from the fact that
A Y . Arresting the deficit and therefore the loss of foreign reserves requires decreasing G, I or 
C. The usual view is to reduce G, which requires decreasing central bank financing to 
government and cutting employment in the civil service.  
 The monetary approach shows more explicitly the connection between the monetary base 
and F . It also combines the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments as follows. 
f fF X M i I R K M D               (2) 
In identity equation 2, fi is the foreign interest rate fI is foreign investments by domestic 
residents. The symbols R and K represent remittances and net FDIs, respectively. D represents 
the change in domestic credit and M the change in the monetary base. Rewriting identity 2 
gives the basic relationship of the monetary approach, which says that the expansion of monetary 
base is the result of increasing F and D . Since the Central Bank of Barbados is experiencing 
falling foreign reserves, the source of the monetary expansion must come from increasing 
domestic credit. Indeed, this is the argument that is made.  
F D M             (3) 
 However, we have to add a behavioral equation to this identity relationship. Assume the 
money market is in equilibrium when ( , , )M L Y P i and the following standard partial 
derivatives hold: ( ) 0L Y  , ( ) 0L P  and ( ) 0L i  ; where Y = domestic income, P = price 
level and i = domestic interest rate.  It follows then that the core prediction of the monetary 
approach is given by equation 4. It says that the central bank will experience falling foreign 
reserves if domestic credit is expanding at a faster rate than money demand. Moreover, a rise in 
domestic income will increase money demand and therefore create a surplus. The same happens 
if there is an increase in the price level. However, a rise in domestic interest rate, ceteris paribus, 
creates a deficit and therefore a reduction in F . This is all dependent on the idea that domestic 
and foreign assets are perfect substitutes. Importantly, also, the monetary approach depends on a 
stable money multiplier. The data in the next section clearly show that as Barbados’ monetary 
base expanded, the multiplier declined significantly, thereby indicating that the central bank’s 
financing of government spending was not completely reflected in the broad monetary 
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aggregates. Therefore, CBB’s advances and concomitant increase of the monetary base cannot be 
the only explanation of the fall in international reserves. 
( ) ( ) ( )F L Y Y L P P L i i D                (4) 
Monetary Dependency 
 The earliest exploration (in the Caribbean) of how commercial banks and the central bank 
operate in a dependent monetary arrangement was done by Thomas (1965). This paper can be 
seen in the spirit of that framework. The model shows that when a small economy is faced with 
external constraints, the public debt (such as treasury bills and other central bank securities) will 
rise. These securities are often held in excess of requirements; hence, the tendency for 
commercial banks to hold excess liquid assets. It should be noted that the domestic and foreign 
security are not perfect substitutes. Residents require foreign currency before they can buy 
foreign assets. The hard currency may not be available at every moment there is a demand. Often 
buyers would need to wait their turn. Hence, the limited foreign exchange at any moment 
constraints the demand. This is the source of an important friction that prevents foreign and local 
securities from being perfect substitutes.  
 The demand for the stock of foreign exchange is given by equation 5. This represents the 
demand by commercial banks and other domestic investors in foreign currency assets.  As is 
typical of these specifications, and invoking the ceteris paribus condition, the demand is 
inversely related to the expected exchange rate, s
e
. Note, for the rest of this paper we use an 
indirect quote whereby the price of the US$ is in local currency: B$/US$. The opposite happens 
when the expected rate rises. The task of the monetary authority, which fixes or manages the 
exchange rate, is to get the expected rate in line with the target rate,
es s . The price of exports 
(PX) acts as the scale variable in the equation. Increase in the index of export prices engenders a 
transaction demand for the stock foreign currency. This means the country is in a position to 
demand more foreign assets (and goods) when PX increases.   
0 1 2
e
D XF F s P cB             (5) 
Our essential contribution is the addition of the stock of domestic-currency bonds, B; 
typically an official security issued either by central government or the central bank for 
‘mopping up excess reserves’. The ‘mopping up’ story is the conventional view more in line with 
monetarist thinking, which holds that reserves determine loans. However, since interest rates are 
sticky given oligopolistic banking and no secondary money market exists, quantities adjust more 
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readily, not prices or interest rates. Hence, we propose that there is an inverse relationship 
between FD and B; whereby the intensity of the relationship is determined by the size of the 
parameter c. This is because the outstanding quantity of sovereign national bonds is supplied for 
the purpose of displacing some of the demand (emanating from residents) for foreign-currency 
assets. In other words, the central bank sells these securities to commercial banks in order to 
create a domestic-driven profit opportunity instead of profits from foreign securities and from 
making the foreign exchange bid-ask spread too wide. This is what we call the compensation 
mechanism, which is institutionally different from the automatic or private bank-driven 
compensation hypothesis described by Lavoie and Wang (2012) and Lavoie (2001). The 
parameter c measures the compensation intensity. The size of c also depends on the required 
transaction cost associated with switching excess cash into foreign-currency assets. Higher 
transaction costs imply a steeper curve and therefore some more policy space for the central bank 
to displace the demand for foreign currency with local securities. The idea that transaction costs 
can provide some policy space for independent monetary policy, even under fixed exchange rate, 
was presented by the former Governor of Central bank of Barbados in an early academic piece 
(Worrell 1995). In that paper, Worrell augmented the uncovered interest parity equation with a 
term for transaction costs, which create a friction restricting capital flows when domestic interest 
rate changes relative to the foreign rate.  
Another factor accounting for the imperfect substitutability is the fact that the central 
bank targets the exchange rate – a fixed rate in the case of Barbados – and by doing so 
quarantines foreign currencies from the private sector. Hence, to maintain the exchange-rate 
target, the monetary authority must not only maintain a credible amount of international reserves, 
but also feed the private banks with an alternative opportunity in the national currency to make 
profit. The two must go together in order to use the exchange rate target as the anchor.   
Furthermore, the parameter c is not the sterilization coefficient. The process of 
sterilization, as explained by the conventional textbooks, requires an institutional set up which 
allows two-sided open market operations. The central bank must be able to buy or sell, 
symmetrically if needed, the net domestic assets in response to the opposite change in its net 
foreign assets. This is clearly not the case in Barbados or in most developing and even relatively 
more advanced emerging market economies. On the other hand, compensation occurs mainly 
through one-sided sales of treasury bills by the central bank to the commercial banks. These one-
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sided sales are supported by the stylized facts – primarily the excess liquid assets that 
commercial banks hold (see Khemraj 2014). In a symmetrical sterilization system this should not 
hold and the excess reserves (and excess liquid assets) would be eliminated in the long-term. 
Interestingly, Worrell (1997) notes that ‘open market operations’ to be primarily sales of treasury 
bills in Barbados. He observed that the banks tend to buy domestic securities because they have 
non-remunerated excess reserves in all periods. Exactly what determines the non-remunerated 
excess reserves is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, we think mentioning two factors 
would be helpful. Firstly, government payments from its account at the central bank is an 
important source given the persistent fiscal deficits
2
. Secondly, over the long term, the monetary 
authority buys foreign currencies from nationals more than it sells, thereby injecting net cash into 
the banking system.  
The reflux principle is another idea we should clarify at this point. If monetary reflux 
holds, then the non-remunerated excess reserves should be used to repay the central bank in the 
case of an overdraft economy
3
. The stylized facts illustrate that non-remunerated excess reserves, 
as well as interest-earning excess liquid assets are persistent. We listed two of their sources 
above. As noted earlier, displacing the excess cash requires the one-sided sales of interest-
earning securities. However, the adjustment which takes place in developing countries is 
different from than that implied by the asset-based and overdraft systems, so clearly outlined by 
Lavoie (2006). The commercial banks (and other private economic actors) in countries with 
peripheral currencies do not use the excess cash to repay loans, but to build up their portfolio of 
foreign-currency assets. Therefore, the monetary reflux occurs in hard-currency flight, not the 
repayment of debt.  
                                                          
2
 Among the other crucially important points raised by Bell (2000), she notes that this channel is a source of excess 
reserves in the case of the United States. Furthermore, for us to understand the source of excess reserves, the central 
bank’s balance sheet must include government deposits on its liability side, as illustrated by Lavoie (2001). 
However, it should be noted that the role of excess liquidity and non-remunerated excess reserves is different in our 
interpretation of the compensation thesis. Non-remunerated excess reserves should be eliminated automatically 
under the Nurkse-ian automatic adjustment – since private banks seek to repay debt owed to central bank – as 
explained by Lavoie (2001) and Lavoie and Wang (2012). In our interpretation, excess reserves are persistent owing 
to the foreign exchange constraint and policy decision of central bank not to neutralize all excess by selling the 
interest-earning security.   
 
3
 For an explanation of the reflux principle see Lavoie (2001) and for historical context of the idea see (Vernengo 
and Rochon 2001). A comprehensive explanation of asset-based versus overdraft economies can be found in Lavoie 
(2006).  
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Moreover, Barbados and many such economies are neither completely asset-based nor 
overdraft economies. The banks obtain reserves via government spending out of its deposits at 
the central bank and when the monetary authority buys foreign currencies from nationals (and 
others) inside the country. They cannot use their national currencies to buy American dollars or 
euros in London or New York. They have peripheral and not hegemonic fiat currencies. Hence, 
the official payments at home create the non-interest cash reserves, often in excess of 
requirements given the logic of persistent fiscal deficits. The underdevelopment or non-existence 
in most cases of the secondary money market means that the economies are not asset-based. 
Most times the banks do not (or cannot) sell treasury bills to obtain reserves. The assets are held 
until they mature. Once the central bank targets the exchange rate the net purchase from the local 
market will always be positive in the long term given the need to maintain a credible amount of 
international reserves. One point that is often ignored in the mainstream literature is the fact that 
these interest-earning excess liquid assets serve the purpose of stabilizing the commercial banks 
because many of them are sold in markets which do not have forward speculators (Khemraj 
2014)
4
.  
 Equation 6 indicates the supply of foreign exchange (in stocks) to the financial sector. 
The supply, assuming everything else is constant, is positively related to s
e
 as is the typical 
specification in open economy macroeconomics. The index of import prices (PM) acts as a unit 
cost in the supply function. Therefore, an increase in the import price decreases the supply of the 
stock of foreign exchange at any given moment. We assume a positive relationship between FS 
and B. This is because selling the domestic securities to locals creates room for more foreign 
currencies to be available to importers and the banks. The parameter d measures the extent to 
which the domestic treasury bills free up foreign exchange supply to the banks. In other words, 
supplying securities to nationals frees up foreign exchange to the banks and importers. We 
postulate that d is a smaller parameter relative to the absolute value of c. The logic for this has to 
do with the long-term deterioration of the terms of trade. The decline in the terms of trade 
implies that the debt-elasticity of supply of foreign currency should fall over time. In other 
words, the positive response of foreign currencies given the supply of domestic debt to the banks 
                                                          
4
 Hence, at least the possibility exists – but has been largely ignored given the persistence of monetarist 
interpretation – for governments in underdeveloped countries to meet some social obligations in spite of the ultimate 
foreign exchange constraint associated with a country with a peripheral currency.  
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should fall in the long run in spite of the wiggle room we mentioned earlier. F0 and F are 
constants.  
3 4
e
S MF F s P dB             (6) 
 Given that we are concerned with a fixed exchange rate system (or a managed one), we 
can replace s
e
 with s . Since s  is the policy target, it becomes an exogenous variable. Dependent 
economies cannot determine either PX or PM since they are price takers on both the export and 
import sides. This means PX and PM are exogenous variables. This allows us to solve for the two 
endogenous variables B* and F*. We further invoke the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis in order to 
restrict the size of the parameters and take note of the fact that the Terms of Trade, TOT = PX/PM. 
The TOT would tend to decline in the long run in dependent developing economies. This is 
consistent with the literature (see Ziesemer 2014, Erten 2011, Etren and Ocampo 2013). The 
following parameter restriction is therefore consistent with the Prebisch-Singer thesis 2 4| |   . 
This restriction implies that both PX and PM could rise in the long run, but the rate of growth of 
PM will be faster than PX, thus accounting for the decline of the TOT.  
Solving for equilibrium B* and F* and setting 
es s will produce equations 7a and 7b. 
0 2 4 1 3( ) ( )* X M
F F P P s
B
c d
       


      (7a) 
0 2 4 1 3
3 4
( ) ( )
* X MM
F F P P s
F F s P d
c d
   
 
     
     
 
   (7b) 
These equations allow us to analyze the outcome in outstanding domestic debt and foreign 
exchange in the long run when the Prebisch-Singer condition holds. This requires analyzing four 
partial derivatives and checking the signs to calculate the net effect. First, we look at the partial 
effect of PX and PM on B*. 
4* 0
M
B
P c d

 
 
         (8a) 
2* 0
X
B
P c d

 
 
         (8b) 
Equations 8a and 8b show positive partial effects on B*. It follows that these two foreign-
determined prices will expand domestic securities. Furthermore, it explains why there is 
significant levels of excess liquid assets in the banking sector of small dependent developing 
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economies. The Barbados banking sector is also very liquid, which indicates the tendency of 
government to lean against global headwinds in order to pursue domestic social objectives.  
 The next task is to explore the foreign exchange outcome in the long run under the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. The partial effects of PX and PM on F* are expressed by equations 8c 
and 8d.  We have two opposing effects. Equation 8a shows that higher export prices will increase 
the foreign exchange, while 8b indicates the opposite effect since 0 / ( ) 1d c d   . Note also 
that d and 2  are small numbers compared with c and 4 . This means that the negative partial 
effect will be greater than the positive one ( | * / | */M XF P F P    ). Therefore, we can conclude 
the foreign exchange situation becomes binding in the long run in spite of the short run policy 
space of selling B to compensate commercial banks.  
2* 0
X
dF
P c d

 
 
         (8c) 
4
*
1 0
M
F d
P c d

  
   
  
        (8d) 
 
Figure 1 Foreign and domestic securities under monetary dependence 
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Figure 1 summarizes the results. Over a long enough period of time, PM will grow at a 
faster rate compared with that of PX, thus worsening the terms of trade. When both of PX and PM 
are increasing over time we can expect that the FS curve will shift downward from FS1 to FS2 and 
the FD curve will shift outward from FD1 to FD2. In keeping with the assumed parameters, the FD 
curve must be relatively steeper than FS (in terms of absolute value). Also, the shift in the FS 
curve should be larger than that of FD given that 2 4| |   . The result is an expansion of the 
stock of domestic securities and a long-run tightening of the availability of foreign exchange
5
. As 
noted previously, this expansion of sales of domestic securities is meant to motivate demand for 
domestic financial assets instead of foreign-currency assets. Finally, the figure shows that the 
ratio  / 0F B    over time as both PX and PM increase. In other words, the FX constraint is 
binding in the long term for dependent economies. It means that the debt-elasticity of FX supply 
also declines in the long run. Perhaps this is why Barbados finds itself in need of an IMF 
program every decade or so.   
 
3. RECENT TRENDS 
These charts provide initial clues into possible factors accounting for the decline in international 
reserves. They indicate monthly data from 2000: Jan to 2017: Dec. The data were sourced from 
Central Bank of Barbados and only the FDI as a percent of GDP was obtained from the World 
Development Indicators.  
The first chart observes the trends in international reserves, as well as the total net foreign 
assets (NFAs) of commercial banks. It also shows the percent of central bank FX reserves 
compared with NFAs of commercial banks. The chart indicates a clear divergence between 
foreign assets held by CBB and all commercial banks. The former’s foreign reserves remained 
virtually flat for the sample period, but took on a distinctive downward trajectory since the first 
quarter of 2013. On the other hand, commercial banks have tended to increase their foreign 
currency assets throughout the period, but with a steeper increase since the third quarter of 2011. 
The bars indicate the percent, which is on the right axis, of CBB’s FX reserves to commercial 
banks’ NFAs. There appears to be a clear structural break in the percent of FX reserves CBB 
                                                          
5
 We do not present the devaluation outcome because the study of devaluation requires a fully specified 
macroeconomic model of income distribution, price formation and capacity utilization. Suffice to say, the partial 
equilibrium presented herein suggests that devaluation will depress domestic assets and foreign exchange in the long 
term. The latter result depends on whether the FD is more responsive to s
e
 than FS is to s
e
. We think for dependent 
developing economies, the partial effect of FD relative to s
e
 should be stronger compared with that of FS.   
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holds since October 2011. The percent declined precipitously after September 2011 when it 
stood at 72 percent. By March 2013, the percent of CBB reserves fell to 47 percent and by the 
end of the review period, December 2017, it fell further to 20 percent.  
 
 
Figure 1 Foreign reserves of CBB and NFA of commercial banks 
 
Overall, both series declined since 2012, thus indicating the overall foreign exchange 
pressure. However, from the middle of 2012 to around June 2017, the NFA of commercial banks 
stabilized around B$2.5 billion (or US$1.25 billion), even as the central bank saw a continual 
decline. After the first half of 2017, both banks and CBB experienced steep decline in foreign 
currency assets. However, the fall in the central bank’s position was much more pronounced, 
causing the percent of CBB foreign assets relative to that of commercial banks to decline 
significantly. The charts below indicate possible determinants of the patterns we observed so far.  
First, we take a look at total commercial bank loans to the private sector. Since domestic 
absorption cannot be measured directly, we use bank loans to the private sector as an indirect 
proxy for domestic demand given that all credit intermediated are demanded. This is illustrated 
by Figure 2, which also presents the percent international reserves of CBB. There was a steady 
increase in bank loans from 2000 to June 2004. There was a steep increase in bank credit after 
2005 until end of 2008; thereafter remaining relatively flat until September 2011. There was a 
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fair amount of volatility from October 2011 until the end of 2012, a period that marked the 
precipitous drop in central bank’s percent of FX reserves. Since January 2013, bank credit has 
contracted gradually.  
 
 
Figure 2 Stock of commercial-bank loans to private sector  
   
 
Figure 3 explores recent trends in the rate of inflation, the money multiplier and the 
monetary base. From 2000 to 2013 the monetary base displayed a stable long-term upward trend 
as we would expect in an economy with growing transaction volume. However, there is a clear 
break in the trend after the first quarter of 2014 when base money expanded significantly. As the 
base expanded steeply, the Barbados economy would enter into a period of negative inflation. 
The multiplier started its steep decline from March 2014. As noted earlier, the percent of central 
bank reserves would fall steeply much earlier. These data patterns are not consistent with the 
idea that the expansion of the monetary base triggered the steep collapse in CBB reserves. The 
findings displayed by Figure 3 is consistent with the endogenous money thesis. Barbadian 
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2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
5,500,000
6,000,000
6,500,000
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Percent of CBB's FX reserves relative to that of commercial banks (right axis)
Total commercial-bank loans, B$000 (left axis)
16 
 
the base is responsive to changes in foreign exchange payments in the Barbadian context. Of 
course, the endogenous money hypothesis is also a cornerstone of post-Keynesian economics in 
both bank and asset-based systems. 
 
 
Figure 3 Inflation, multiplier and monetary base 
 
 A few other trends are worth mentioning, but we will not present another chart in the 
hope of saving space. It should be noted that the fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP, for the review 
period, reached its peak at 10.1 percent in 2013. However, the deficit declined continually after 
2013 to reach 4 percent of GDP by 2017. The net FDI flow collapsed in 2013 to -0.2 percent. It 
did similar in 2004 when it was -0.3 percent. However, net FDIs increase to 12 percent of GDP 
in 2014 and subsequently declined to an average around 6 percent for 2015, 2016 and 2017. For 
the entire review period, public sector wage as a percent of GDP was around 8.2 percent. The 
highest amount of public sector wage occurred in 2013 and amounted to 10.1 percent of GDP. 
The wage bill as a percent of GDP declined marginally by 2017 when it reached 9.1 percent. 
These trends do not appear to be the trigger for the sudden rise in EMP around late 2011 to 2012.  
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
From the theoretical analyses we have two conventional explanations: the absorption approach 
and the monetary approach. Our data set allows us to test more explicitly the monetary approach. 
The monthly financial and monetary statistics can only indirectly test the absorption approach.  
The monetary dependence model is the unconventional explanation. Two econometric models 
are estimated to search for long-run relations as implied by the two theories. A hybrid model, 
combining the two approaches, is also estimated. These three models are intended to estimate the 
possible factors determining the level of foreign reserves of CBB. A fourth model is estimated to 
investigate probable determinants of NFAs of commercial banks.  
The peril of estimating level-based relationships using time-series data is well known. 
Even cointegration tests for long-term level relations might also uncover spurious relations 
(Moosa 2017). Therefore, we rely on economic theory, intuition and knowledge of Barbadian 
economic structure to set up the models to study exchange market pressure in Barbados. The 
empirical strategy estimates four separate level models, as well as the short-term counterparts, 
instead of a single EMP model. The single model would likely result in identification problems 
given the competing theories and variables. For example, it is clear that an opportunity cost 
variable, such as the domestic prime lending rate, would determine the commercial banks’ 
demand for NFA, but not the central bank’s demand for international reserves. The excess 
reserves of the commercial banks should increase their demand for NFAs as found by Bakker 
(1993) and Khemraj (2009), but not the demand for central bank’s FX reserves and so on.  
The first model to be estimated is in the spirit of the monetary approach and somewhat in 
the absorption approach. The main determinants of CBB’s demand for FX reserves would be (i) 
a foreign interest rate that captures a speculative dimension of demand (which we proxy by the 
3-month US Treasury bill rate), (ii) a precautionary motive (which is measured by the negative 
rating outlook of Moody’s and Standard and Poor and volatility), and (iii) factors exerting 
downward pressure on demand for foreign reserves. The latter would include variables consistent 
with the monetary approach and the monetary dependency thesis.  
The general ARDL model which nests the competing hypotheses is expressed as follows 
1 2 11 0
log log log
p q
t i t i t i M D ti i
F N F r Z Z                 
Where F = central bank’s holding of FX reserves; N = 1 for negative outlook from Moody’s or 
Standard or Poor and 0 otherwise; and r = three-month United States Treasury bill rate.  The 
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vector ZM includes variables at different lags unique to the monetary approach and perhaps 
tangentially to the absorption approach.  
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AC = CBB’s monetary advances to the central government; LG = commercial bank loans to 
central government; LU = commercial bank loans to public utilities; and LP = total commercial 
bank loans to the private sector. The row vector  includes contemporaneous and lagged 
elasticities to be measured given the double-log specification.  
On the other hand, the vector ZD includes variables at different lags that are unique to our 
conceptualization of monetary dependency; namely, the country’s reserve target is restricted by 
possessing a peripheral currency. ST = the United States trade-weighted exchange rate; PO = 
Brent price of oil; and VOil measures the oil price volatility; and SV represents the volatility of 
the trade-weighted dollar exchange rate. Since, Barbados has a fixed exchange rate against the 
dollar, the trade-weighted value of the dollar should matters for the availability of foreign 
exchange. This exchange rate measures the strength of the dollar against the Euro Area, Canada, 
United Kingdom and other main trading partners of the United States. We expect that an 
appreciating trade-weighted exchange rate should reduce the flow of non-American tourists into 
Barbados and therefore the availability of foreign currencies. Indeed, American tourists account 
for just about 14 percent of all tourists going to Barbados. Also, since capital goods are priced in 
terms of dollars, an appreciation of the rate would also increase the cost of imports and reduce 
the amount of FX available to the private sector and CBB. A depreciation of the dollar should 
have the opposite effect. The row vector  includes elasticities.  
log
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 The general ARDL model for estimating the commercial banks’ demand for NFA can be 
written as: 
0 1
log log
p
t i t ii
NFA NFA X      
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Where,  
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The vector X includes the variables of different lags so as to make it a true ARDL. The row 
vector  includes the elasticities on the contemporaneous and lagged variables. The opportunity 
cost of demanding NFAs is making loans at home. This is measured by prime loan rate in 
Barbados, Lr , which would also indicate the speculative motive once we subtract the foreign 
interest rate mentioned earlier. One unique factor that should influence the demand for NFAs by 
banks is the amount of excess reserves in the banking system (Khemraj 2009, Bakker 1993). We 
do not have the excess reserves data, but we do have total reserves, which is indicated by LIQ. 
The other variables postulated to affect commercial banks’ NFAs were discussed earlier.  
 The analysis is done using monthly data from Jan: 2000 to Dec: 2017. Most of the 
statistics came from Central Bank of Barbados. However, the three-month US Treasury bill, 
trade-weighted American dollar exchange rate and Brent oil price were obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/). The exchange rate and oil price 
volatility were measured using a GARCH (1, 1) estimate of mean and variance equations. The 
negative outlook rating for Moody’s and Standard & Poor comes from Trading Economics 
(https://tradingeconomics.com/barbados/rating).  
 The following partial effects are expected to hold. Firstly, we expect CBB advances to 
central government, and commercial bank loans to public utilities and central government to 
have a negative effect on the central bank’s demand for FX reserves. Secondly, commercial bank 
loans to the private sector could have either a negative or positive effect. If the domestic 
absorption effect is great, there should be a negative partial effect or coefficient. On the other 
hand, if commercial bank loans contribute to growth in the tradable sector and therefore FX 
earnings, we expect a positive effect. Thirdly, the negative rating outlook dummy variable 
measures a precautionary effect. It should have a positive partial effect regardless of whether we 
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are estimating the monetary model, monetary dependency model or hybrid model. Fourthly, the 
level of the oil price must have a negative partial effect in the monetary dependency model since 
it represents a cost of importing. Fifthly, the volatility measures from oil price and trade-
weighted exchange rate is expected to have a positive effect on central bank behavior. Higher 
volatility would induce a precautionary effect on behalf of the CBB. Finally, the trade-weighted 
exchange rate is postulated to have a negative partial effect on international reserves.  
 As it relates to commercial banks’ demand for NFA, we propose the following partial 
effects. Firstly, the term Lr r would have a negative effect, all other factors remaining constant. 
Secondly, the trade-weighted exchange rate will have a negative partial effect. This is because a 
stronger American trade-weighted rate reduces the flow of hard currencies coming to Barbados. 
A depreciation will have the opposite effect. Thirdly, LIQ will exert a positive partial effect. The 
rationale here is once the banks have excess of reserves over the required level, they will buy 
foreign assets instead of extending loans at home. Fourthly, the volatility measures, as well as the 
negative rating dummy, should induce a precautionary effect. The reasoning here is banks would 
require holding more foreign currency assets in uncertain times to meet the business needs of 
established customers, many of whom also received loans in Barbados from the banks.  
 We tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. 
All the series were found to be I (1), except for the oil price volatility and trade-weighted 
exchange rate volatility. The conditional volatilities were found to be I (0) or stationary. No 
series was determined to be I (2). Therefore, we adopted the Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) 
bounds testing approach for estimating the level relationships of the theories. In the case of the 
monetary approach model, all the variables were I (1) in levels; therefore, we supplemented the 
bounds test with the Johansen cointegration test.  
 Table 1 presents the long-run estimates of the three models. The diagnostic tests – given 
the high p-values – indicate that the models do not suffer from serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity. The AIC test indicates the best result for the MD model, followed by the -
2.667 for the MA model. The strongest cointegration result occurs for the MD model followed 
by the HM. In the case of the former the F-Stat. of 5.76 exceeds the upper I (1) bound at the one 
percent level. The F-Stat = 4.44 for the HM just marginally exceeds the upper bound one percent 
critical value of 4.43. The supplemental Johansen cointegration test for the MA model confirms 
the level relationship according to trace test and the max-eigenvalue test at the five percent 
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significance level. The 3-month U.S. treasury bill rate was found to be statistically and 
economically insignificant in all cases. Therefore, we are not reporting these estimates. The oil 
price volatility produced mixed results. Therefore, the volatility measure here is the trade-
weighted exchange rate.  
 
Table 1 Long-run estimates and diagnostic tests: CBB’s demand for foreign reserves 
Dependent variable: Log (FX reserves of Central Bank) 
 
 
Variables 
Long-run 
estimates: 
Monetary 
approach 
(MA) 
Long-run 
estimates: 
Monetary 
dependence 
(MD) 
Long-run 
estimates: 
Hybrid model 
(HM) 
Log (CBB advances to 
central govt.) 
-0.325 
(pv = 0.111) 
- -0.220 
(pv = 0.125) 
Log (Comm. bank 
loans to central govt) 
-0.053 
(pv = 0.178) 
 
- 
Economically and 
statistically 
insignificant 
Log (Comm. bank 
loans to public 
utilities) 
-0.00014 
(pv = 0.002) 
 
- 
-0.254 
(pv = 0.043) 
Log (Total loans to 
private sector from 
comm. banks) 
1.672 
(pv = 0.015) 
 
- 
1.274 
(pv = 0.037) 
 
Volatility: Trade-
weighted Ex. rate 
 
 
- 
 
 
12.609 
(pv = 0.054) 
 
13.908 
(pv = 0.099 
Log (US$ trade- 
weighted exchange  
rate) 
 
- 
-6.708 
(pv = 0.001) 
-7.098 
(pv = 0.005) 
Negative rating: S&P 
and Moody’s (dummy 
variable) 
0.516 
(pv = 0.115) 
0.339 
(pv = 0.114) 
0.423 
(pv = 0.133) 
Bounds cointegration and other tests 
Serial correlation: LM 
test: F-Stat. 
0.91 
(pv = 0.535) 
1.06 
(pv = 0.395) 
1.40 
(pv = 0.172) 
ARCH (12): F-Stat. 0.73 
(pv = 0.723) 
0.57 
(pv = 0.867) 
1.28 
(pv = 0.242) 
AIC 
 
-2.667 
 
-2.581 -2.709 
 
Bounds test: F-Stat. 
 
3.78**[10% I(0) 
bound = 2.45; 10% 
I(1) bound = 3.52] 
 
5.76* [1% I(0) 
bound = 3.65.; 1% 
I(1) bound = 4.66] 
4.44* [1% I(0) 
bound = 3.15; 1% 
I(1) bound = 4.43] 
*Significant at 1% level. 
**Significant at 10% level. Since all variables in MA model are I (1), the Johansen tests 
was done as a robustness check. It supports the existence of the cointegrating equation. 
Both Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue tests support cointegration at 5% level for the MA 
model.  
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The elasticities for the MA model are relatively small. Central bank advances (money 
printing) to the central government has an elasticity of -0.325. Although an economically 
significant number, it is statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0.111. The p-value of the 
money-printing elasticity does not improve substantially in the HM, but it is an economically 
notable elasticity of -0.220. Commercial banks’ loans to public utilities is statistically significant 
given the low p-value = 0.002, but economically insignificant at -0.00014. The size of the 
elasticity increases substantially in the HM, where it becomes both economically (elasticity = -
0.254) and statistically significant at the five percent level (p-value = 0.043). The most 
statistically significant variable in the MA model is the total commercial bank loans to the 
private sector. The high positive elasticity is economically significant as well (1.672 in MA and 
1.274 in HM). The positive value suggests that private sector credit has a favorable effect on the 
tradable sector, which outweighs the absorption effect.  Commercial bank loans to central 
government show little economic or statistical significance.  
In the long run, the strongest factor reducing the central bank’s FX reserves is the US 
trade-weighted dollar exchange rate. The elasticity is -6.908 in the MD model and -7.098 in the 
HM. It is also the most statistically significant explanatory variable in both the MD model and 
HM with very low p-values of 0.001 and 0.005, respectively. We were surprised by the large size 
of the elasticity representing CBB’s precautionary response to world exchange rate volatility. 
This result is also fairly statistically significant. The negative credit rating has the correct sign 
indicating the precautionary behavior of the CBB across all the models. However, the p-values 
indicate statistical insignificance since they all exceed the ten percent level.  
For completeness Table 2 reports the short-run error correction models. The short-term 
elasticities tend to make sense. Total loans to the private sector appears to have short-term 
negative effect on CBB’s foreign reserves. This implies the absorption effect holds only in the 
short run, but not in the long run. The trade-weighted volatility is not significant in the short run. 
However, the trade-weighted rate continues its strong effect even in the short term with estimates 
of -0.852 and -0.749 in the MD and HM, respectively. The negative rating dummy variable is a 
lot more statistically significant in the short run. Of particular interest here is the sign and 
statistical significance of the cointegration term, which has the expected negative sign in all the 
models and is highly statistically significant; hence, confirming that the level relationships are 
not spurious.  
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Table 2 Short-run estimates: CBB’s demand for foreign reserves  
Dependent variable:  [Log (FX reserves of Central Bank)] 
 
 
 
Variables 
Short-run 
estimates: 
Monetary 
approach 
Short-run 
estimates: 
Monetary 
dependence 
Short-run 
estimates: 
Hybrid model 
 [Log (CBB 
advances to central 
govt.)] 
-0.031 
(pv = 0.049) 
 
- 
-0.029 
(pv = 0.031) 
 [Log (Comm. 
bank loans to central 
govt)] 
-0.008 
(pv = 0.333) 
 
- 
Economically 
and statistically 
insignificant 
 [Log (Comm. 
bank loans to public 
utilities)] 
-0.00002 
(pv = 0.126) 
 
- 
-0.034 
(pv = 0.112) 
 [Log (Total loans 
to private sector 
from comm. banks)] 
-0.594 
(pv = 0.068) 
 
- 
-0.580 
(pv = 0.062) 
 
 [ Trade-weighted 
Ex. rate volatility] 
 
 
- 
 
 
2.635 
(pv = 0.200) 
 
0.524 
(pv = 0.606) 
 [Log (US$ trade- 
weighted exchange  
rate)] 
 
- 
-0.852 
(pv = 0.033) 
-0.749 
(pv = 0.063) 
Negative rating: 
S&P and Moody’s 
(dummy variable) 
0.037 
(pv = 0.008) 
0.032 
(pv = 0.011) 
0.037 
(pv = 0.004) 
Cointegrating term -0.080 
(pv = 0.000) 
-0.117 
(pv = 0.000) 
-0.094 
(pv = 0.000) 
 
Adj-R
2 
 
0.126 
 
0.141 
 
0.177 
 
AIC  
 
-2.526 
 
-2.555 
 
-2.561 
  
The final results are presented in Table 3, which includes both the level relationship and 
the short-term error correction model (ECM). The interest rate variable was dropped because it 
was statistically and economically insignificant. The bounds cointegration test with F-Stat. = 
4.88 test statistic exceeds the upper I (1) limit, thus indicating a level relationship at the five 
percent level. This is confirmed by the negative sign and high statistical significance of the 
cointegration term in the ECM. The LM serial correlation test for 12 lags indicates the absence 
of this problem. However, the ARCH (12) test indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity.   
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Table 3 Long-run and short-run estimates: commercial banks’ demand for NFAs 
Long-run model Short-run model  
Dependent variable: log (commercial bank NFA) Dependent variable:  [log (commercial bank 
NFA)] 
Log (US$ trade- weighted 
exchange  rate) 
 
-1.331 
(pv = 0.016) 
 [Log (US$ trade- 
weighted exchange rate)] 
-0.263 
(pv = 0.450) 
Log (Liquid bank reserves) 
 
0.345 
(pv = 0.000) 
 [Log (Liquid bank 
reserves)] 
0.050 
(pv = 0.041) 
 
Volatility: Oil price 
0.308 
(pv = 0.081) 
 
 (Oil price volatility)  
0.055 
(pv = 0.178) 
 
Cointegration bounds test 
4.88* [5% I(0) 
bound = 3.23; 5% 
I(1) bound = 4.35] 
 
Cointegrating term 
 
-0.122 
(pv = 0.000) 
Serial correlation: LM test: 
F-Stat. 
1.32 
(pv = 0.210) 
Adj-R
2 
 0.084 
ARCH (12): F-Stat. 2.17 
(pv = 0.015)** 
  
* Significant at 5% level statistical significance. 
** Rejects hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity 
 
Nevertheless, the trade-weighted exchange rate has a statistically significant negative 
effect on NFAs, thus compounding the foreign exchange pressure on top of its much larger 
negative effect on CBB’s reserves. The negative effect also holds in the short run, but it is 
statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0.45. The coefficient estimate of LIQ has the expected 
sign and is statistically significant. This is consistent with the finding for Guyana by Khemraj 
(2009). It implies excess reserves from money printing do not make more loans, but they are 
used to purchase foreign currency assets. The oil price volatility has a larger effect in the long 
than short term.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This papwer explains why Barbados finds itself in a situation of acute FX shortages 
approximately every ten to twelve years. External factors are the main drivers, not a profligate 
government. The proposed monetary dependency model explains that the build-up of liquid 
assets is a signal that the government and central bank are leaning against global headwinds 
while trying to maintain social goals at home. The monetary strategy involves offsetting the 
demand for foreign-currency assets with local treasury bills. This strategy is often seen as 
mopping up excess reserves. However, it is part of a compensation strategy that involves 
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displacing the private sector’s demand for foreign securities with domestic ones. This strategy is 
at the center of monetary policy that does not require an interest rate instrument – as there is no 
well-developed interbank market and the loan rate is a markup – but quantitative adjustments of 
a national security via one-sided sales.  
Although we found weak evidence in favor of CBB’s money printing contributing to the 
decline in international reserves, the results are much stronger in favor of the monetary 
dependency thesis. Furthermore, the model of monetary dependency proposed herein is 
applicable beyond Barbados. The latter thesis implies that external economic forces are 
responsible for the foreign exchange pressure in an economy in the periphery. In particular, the 
strongest determinant is the U.S. trade-weighted exchange rate. This means that in spite of its 
fixed exchange rate, Barbados’ foreign exchange availability both at central bank and 
commercial banks is determined by the dollar’s trade-weighted rate. In other words, the de facto 
exchange rate of this fixed exchange rate economy is the American trade-weighted rate relative 
to the trading partners of United States. As the rate appreciates, it makes it expensive for non-
American tourists to visit Barbados and increases the amount of U.S. dollars Barbados would 
need to import capital goods. 
 These findings raise serious doubts whether the policy response of austerity can address 
the conditions necessary to create resilience to global shocks. The austerity measures have to be 
supported by efforts to reorganize the economic structure of production to conserve and generate 
foreign currencies. The authorities can also explore alternative auctioning mechanisms for 
government treasury bills, since these quantity adjustments represent the best way forward for 
short-run stabilization while at the same time meeting social obligations. Price signaling via 
interest rate instrument is unlikely to work in a system of oligopolistic banking. The return of a 
few indigenous banks might also help.   
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